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ABSTRACT
This study’s aim was to investigate the main aspects that determined the use of the stock-based compensation model and the 
variables that influence the amount paid. The article fills the gap in the previous debate regarding the variables that affect the 
decision to offer stock-based remuneration, as well as revealing the factors that impact its magnitude and providing a more 
robust statistical treatment with regards to endogeny. Brazil is known to be a country where the agency conflict between 
controlling and minority shareholders predominates, and so it is important to understand the determinants of adoption 
and of the amount paid to managers using stock options, since remuneration can be used as a form of tunneling. This study 
identified a possible trade-off between cash and stock compensation, in view of increased company indebtedness. It also 
found that in the Brazilian market this type of remuneration is not related to governance and performance. A panel data 
regression was used with fixed effects in the firm and industry*year to eliminate the possible bias arising from constant 
heterogeneities in time for the firms and shocks in the industries in a particular year. In addition, to identify the determinants, 
we used a logistic regression with panel data and fixed effect in industry*year. The study sample comprised 287 companies 
listed on the Bolsa, Brasil, Balcão (B3) exchange. This research shows that 40% of the companies in the period from 2010 
to 2016 adopted stock-based compensation plans; however, the amount paid is still low, at 0.03% of total company assets. 
The results indicate that in the Brazilian market variables such as investment opportunities and company size increase the 
likelihood of adopting the employee stock options plan (ESOP). In addition, regarding the amount paid, this is negatively 
related to company leverage, indicating that in possible liquidity shocks the companies opt to compensate managers with 
shares to reduce their exposure to systematic risks.
Keywords: agency theory, employee stock option plans, ESOP, determinants, Brazilian market. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the current competitive environment, companies are 
dedicating more and more attention to potential internal 
instability factors, such as human resource management, 
conflict of interests, and the need to motivate employees 
(Manzoor, 2012; Shin & Konrad, 2017). This process 
gains an even more important connotation in the field 
of publicly-traded companies, in which the separation 
between shareholders and managers tends to cause 
problems such as information asymmetry, the search for 
self-satisfaction to the detriment of satisfying the hiring 
party, and a divergence in interests between agent and 
hirer (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
Thus, many tools have been created with the intention 
of mitigating the effects derived from the agency conflict. 
It is in this context that the stock-based compensation 
plan, more commonly known as the employee stock 
options plan (ESOP), has been constituted as one of the 
main instruments for incentivizing agents with the aim of 
mitigating conflicts of interest in the internal organizational 
environment (Jensen, Murphy & Wruck, 2004).
However, as shown by La Porta, Lopes-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (1999) and La Porta, Lopes-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (2000), the predominant agency conflict 
in the Brazilian market is the type II conflict, between 
controlling shareholder and minority shareholder. 
Controlling shareholders will use strategies to divert the 
organization’s resources in order to benefit themselves, 
such as selling company assets at low cost to other 
companies only they own, hiring services from their 
own companies at above-market prices, or granting loans 
and other operations, as shown by Johnson, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000), who call practices 
such as these “tunneling”.
Wang and Xiao (2011) highlight the possibility of 
tunneling via executive pay, because firms with a higher 
propensity for this practice would have the manager 
remuneration and compensation packages less sensitive 
to performance. Thus, in environments with a high 
shareholder concentration and the type II conflict, 
corporate performance may not be determinant for the 
implementation of stock-based payment, nor influence 
the amount paid to managers (Wang & Xiao, 2011).
In light of the above, this article has two aims: (i) 
to investigate what the determinants are for the use of 
stock-based compensation plans; and (ii) to investigate 
what the factors are that influence the amount paid in the 
form of stock-based remuneration. Both objectives refer 
to the companies listed on the Bolsa, Brasil, Balcão (B3) 
exchange in the period from 2010 to 2016.
The data were collected from the reference forms, 
the accounting statements, and the management reports 
of the companies analyzed and can be found on the B3 
website and in the Comdinheiro database. The sample 
was restricted to 315 companies for the basic model 
and 287 with the data available needed to estimate the 
determinants of stock-based remuneration. 
To achieve the objective of this study, a panel data linear 
regression was used with the presence of firm fixed effects 
to control for the constant unobserved heterogeneity 
in time and industry*year fixed effects to control for 
common demand shocks to the industry in year t, and 
for the determinants of stock-based payment a logistic 
regression was used with panel data and fixed effects in 
the industry and year (Gormley & Matsa, 2013).
This study is warranted because of the growing 
importance of executive pay and the consequent 
alignment of interests between directors and shareholders. 
The importance of carrying out this research in the 
Brazilian setting lies in it being an emergent economy; 
the characteristics of governance in the country, such 
as the type I agency conflict, between shareholder and 
management, and the type II agency conflict, between 
majority shareholder and minority shareholder (La 
Portaet al., 1999; La Porta et al., 2000); as well as the 
high shareholder concentration in the Brazilian market, 
as shown by Ermel and do Monte (2018).
In addition, this study makes advances by investigating 
the effects of controlling shareholder concentration and 
the accumulation of the roles of chairman of the board and 
chief executive officer (CEO) on the decision to offer stock-
based pay, as well as investigating the factors that influence 
the amount paid in stock-based compensation and, thus, 
we verify possible sensitivity between remuneration and 
performance, since executive pay may be a possible way 
of tunneling resources (Urzúa, 2009). Also with regards 
to the innovation and relevance of the research, in which 
the authors’ knowledge is important, this is the first 
Brazilian study to investigate these effects on the stock-
based amount paid to managers.
Regarding the study’s first objective, the findings 
indicate that an increase in investment opportunities 
within the firm, as well as an increase in size, raises 
the probability of paying the managers using stocks. In 
relation to the second, the stock-based amount paid is 
Stock-based compensation plan: an analysis of the determinants of its use
86 R. Cont. Fin. – USP, São Paulo, v. 31, n. 82, p. 84-98, jan./abr. 2020
intrinsically linked to a higher Tobin’s Q; that is, there is 
a positive correlation between investment opportunities 
and the value received by the managers. In addition, a 
positive correlation was also observed between company 
leverage and stock-based pay; thus, this result suggests 
that when faced with possible liquidity problems more 
indebted firms increase the value paid to their managers 
with stocks, possibly to avoid the use of cash.
Besides this introduction, this article is divided into 
five sections. The second involves the literature review, 
in which the main theoretical aspects of stock-based 
compensation plans are discussed, also carrying out 
an empirical review of the literature that addresses the 
determinants of the adoption of ESOPs. The third explains 
the methodology used in the research, the fourth carries 
out the descriptive and econometric analysis of the results, 
and finally there are the main conclusions of the study.
2. THOERETICAL ASPECTS OF THE STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION PLAN
The stock-based compensation plan, more commonly 
known as ESOP, emerged in the United Kingdom and 
the United States between 1950 and 1960, as a way of 
granting agents, via contracts, the right to buy stocks 
for a previously established price during a previously 
established period (Murphy, 1999). Hall (2000) highlights 
that stock options for executives configure options to buy 
in which an agent acquires the right to purchase stocks 
based on a particular price. Also according to Hall (2000), 
the main objective of the ESOP is to link executive pay to 
company performance, making the executives perceive 
that the incentive will only occur if the entity performs 
well. Otherwise, if the company incurs financial losses, 
they will also participate in the process.
It is within this context that the ESOP lies. The growing 
use of this instrument, especially from the 1990s onwards, 
is explained by a number of important aspects. According 
to Hall and Murphy (2003), the main argument in favor 
of stock-based compensation plans is that they incentivize 
agents to act in accordance with shareholder interests, 
especially as they link these agents’ pay to share price 
performance. Regarding this aspect, in an older study, 
Hall and Murphy (2002) demonstrate that the ESOP 
creates incentives for executives to take measures that 
favor share price increases, as well as avoiding measures 
that reduce share prices.
Concerning these positive aspects, some studies 
weave criticisms of this stock-based compensation 
model. Authors such as Yermack (1995) draw attention 
to the potential power of agents to manipulate data and 
information, demystifying the thesis that the ESOP 
creates incentives for executives to act in accordance 
with shareholder interests. For Delves (2004), the ESOP 
configures a problem for two basic reasons: (i) high share 
concessions in the hands of executives, which tends to 
promote risk taking on the part of these agents vis-à-vis 
profit maximization, leading to financial problems for 
the companies; and (ii) it is an ineffective instrument for 
combatting the agency problem.
In Brazil, as highlighted by Nunes and Marques (2005), 
the use of this instrument dates back to the 1970s, greatly 
due to the U.S. companies installed in the country. Also 
according to the authors, the adoption of this mechanism 
has risen in recent years in the country, and is regulated 
by article 168 of Law n. 6,404, of December 15th of 1976, 
which describes the possibility of paying agents using stock 
options plans. It is worth mentioning that the Accounting 
Pronouncements Committee (CPC) also regulates the 
adoption of stock-based plans, via CPC 10 (CPC, 2010), 
highlighting procedures for recognizing and disclosing in 
accounting statements stock-based payment transactions 
carried out by the entity.
2.1 Determinants of Stock-Based Compensation: 
Previous Studies
In the literature, a number of important articles are 
found that have addressed the determinants of the use of 
ESOPs. It is worth mentioning that the word “adoption” 
is used interchangeably in the international literature 
for firms paying stock-based remuneration for the first 
time in their history, as well as for companies that pay it 
one year, do not pay it the next, then pay it again in the 
following year. Yermack (1995), for example, analyzed 
the determinants of the use of stock options for CEOs 
from 792 U.S. companies in the 1984-1991 period. The 
author tested nine hypotheses and found only three 
statistically significant results. The first is that, in regulated 
industries, such as public sector companies, there is a lower 
probability of stock options being used. The second is that 
companies tend to use greater stock option incentives 
when accounting profit is composed of large quantities 
of noise (accruals, especially discretionary). The third is 
the positive relationship between liquidity constraints and 
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the use of stock options; that is, the companies analyzed 
that suffered from liquidity problems were more likely 
to modify their remuneration system from one based 
on cash salaries and bonuses to the stock-based model.
Subsequently, Ding and Sun (2001) developed a study 
with the aim of identifying the determinants for the 
adoption of the ESOP in Singapore and measuring the 
impact of this adoption on shareholder wealth, based on 
263 firms from the country in the period from 1992 to 
1995. Specifically concerning the first aim of the study, 
that is, the determinants for ESOPs, the authors found 
that the firms’ growth opportunities, represented by the 
market-to-book variable, has a positive relationship with 
the use of stock options. They also verified that the further 
a company’s net income is from its target, the greater the 
likelihood of using stocks. Finally, they identified that the 
lower the interest coverage ratio, the greater the probability 
of the companies using these plans. The authors also 
carried out robustness tests for the determinants of ESOPs 
if companies from the financial sector were excluded. The 
results converged with those found previously, only with 
the inclusion of the logarithm of total assets as a proxy 
for company size. The results found indicate that smaller 
companies are more likely to adopt ESOPs.
Along the same lines as Ding and Sun (2001), Kato, 
Lemmon, Luo, and Schallheim (2005) examined the 
introduction of 562 stock options used by 344 different 
companies between June of 1997 and December of 2001, 
in Japan, paying special attention to the costs and benefits 
of adopting these instruments. Despite the broad focus 
of the study, the authors concentrated on analyzing the 
determinants of ESOPs in the Japanese firms, considering 
for methodological purposes only 316 of the 344 initial 
companies. The results reveal that factors such as growth 
opportunities, dividend payments, firm size, and return 
on assets are positively related with the probability of 
adopting ESOPs. In contrast, aspects such as company 
leverage and ownership structure are negatively related 
with the adoption of ESOPs.
Also for Japan, Uchida (2006) analyzed the determinants 
of the use of ESOPs in a sample of 782 Japanese companies 
between 1997 and 2002. It is worth mentioning that, of 
this universe, only 109 received approval to use stock 
options. The main results found by the author show that 
factors such as leverage and dividend payments have a 
negative relationship with the probability of adopting 
ESOPs, while firm size, growth opportunities, and degree 
of independence have a positive relationship.
Tzioumis (2008) analyzed the determinants of 
introducing the ESOP in U.S. firms in the 1994-2004 
period. Among the results found, on one hand it stands 
out that the rotativity of CEOs in a firm increases the 
probability of that company using the ESOP. In addition, 
the firm’s risk was also statistically significant and had 
a positive sign. On the other hand, CEO shareholder 
participation, his/her age, and public sector companies 
presented a negative relationship with the probability of 
adopting the ESOP. The author also applied a robustness 
test with the intention of confirming the results. The results 
converged with those found previously, with the exception 
of shareholder returns, which was shown to be significant 
at the 10% level and had a positive sign, of Tobin’s Q, 
which was revealed to be significant at the 5% level and 
had a negative sign, and of public sector firms, which, in 
the robustness test, did not show statistical significance. 
Chourou, Abaoub, and Saadi (2008) analyzed the 
economic determinants of the use of ESOPs for 196 
companies from Canada between 2001 and 2004. In this 
study, the authors used two dependent variables: (i) the 
ratio between the annual value of the stock options and 
the cash compensation; and (ii) the intensity of the stock 
option incentives. For the first, the results showed a positive 
relationship with growth opportunities and firm size and 
a negative relationship with leverage, CEO age, CEO 
shareholding, and large blockholding shareholders. For 
the second, a positive relationship was found for “noise” in 
the measurement of accounting performance and a negative 
one was found for CEO shareholding and blockholders.
Avallone, Quagli, and Ramassa (2014) sought to 
identify the effect of implementing International Financial 
Reporting Standards 2 (IFRS 2) and of the recent financial 
crisis over the adoption of the stock options model in 1,555 
Italian companies in the 2000-2009 period. Regarding the 
focus on these two factors, it should be mentioned that 
the authors also used other more traditional variables, 
such as alignment of incentives, liquidity constraints, tax 
benefits, and growth opportunities. The authors found 
that the obligation to follow IFRS 2 did not reduce the 
adoption of ESOPs by the Italian companies investigated. 
In contrast, the financial crisis, as was to be expected, 
resulted in a reduction in the use of this model. With 
regards to growth opportunities, a positive correlation 
with increased stock options use was verified, which also 
occurred in the test of the alignment of incentives variable. 
Finally, liquidity constraints and tax benefits showed less 
significance with respect to the use of ESOPs.
Luo (2015) investigated the economic determinants 
of the use of 225 stock options in 212 different Chinese 
companies between January of 2006 and June of 2013. 
The results reveal that company size, dividends, and three 
types of company ownership – when it is under manager 
control, under private control, and under external investor 
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control – are negatively associated with the use of stock 
options. Regarding company ownership, the study also 
showed that state companies, which are quite common in 
China, are less likely to use these plans. In contrast, the 
author identified that factors such as market-to-book and 
previous share return presented a positive correlation with 
remuneration based on stock options, but only for those 
that go to senior managers. Finally, it was verified that total 
risk and non-systematic risk increase the probability of 
implementing such plans, while systematic risk reduces 
this likelihood.
Analyzing the Brazilian case, Dias (2010) sought to 
identify the factors that determined stocks being used 
in the form of remuneration in 237 companies in 2009. 
Regarding the variables that were shown to be statistically 
significant, capital concentration and industry regulation 
presented a negative relationship with the use of stock 
options, while firm size, growth opportunities, and foreign 
shareholder participation in the companies revealed a 
positive relationship. 
In another study, Kaveski, Vogt, Degenhart, Hein, 
and Scarpin (2015) sought to analyze the factors that 
determined stock-based compensation for the directors 
of companies listed on the B3 in the period from 2010 
to 2012. It is worth highlighting that only 27 companies 
formed part of the sample, which may be explained by the 
scarcity of Brazilian companies that pay their executives 
using stock options and by the independent variables 
chosen by the authors to develop the study, namely: 
(i) return on total assets; (ii) market-to-book; and (iii) 
total revenue. Of these variables, all were shown to be 
statistically significant, but only market-to-book revealed 
a positive relationship with stock-based remuneration.
Finally, there is the study from Moura, Padilha, and 
Silva (2016), which sought to identify the determining 
factors for the adoption of stock options plans in 158 
publicly-traded Brazilian companies, in the period from 
2009 to 2012. Breaking the results down by periods, the 
authors found that factors such as current liquidity, in the 
period from 2010 to 2012, the horizon problem, in the 
period from 2009 to 2012, and shareholder participation, 
in 2012, showed statistical significance and a positive 
relationship, and could be considered determinants for 
the adoption of stock options plans. 
Table 1 
Summary of the main empirical studies involving stock-based compensation
Authors/year Sample Metrics Results
Yermack 
(1995)
792 U.S. companies in the 
period from 1984 to 1991
Regulation; accounting 
profit; liquidity constraint.
Positive relationship for accounting profit and liquidity 
constraint in relation to using stock options and an inverse 
relationship for the regulation variable.
Ding and Sun 
(2001) 
262 firms form Singapore 
in the period from 1992 
to 1995
Market-to-book; profit 
target; interest coverage; 
firm size.
Positive relationship between the use of stock options and the 
variables market-to-book, profit target, a lower interest coverage 
ratio, and smaller companies.
Kato et al. 
(2005) 
562 stock options 
granted by 344 different 
companies between June 
of 1997 and December 
of 2001
Growth opportunity; 
dividend payments; 
firm size; ROA; debt; 
ownership structure.
Growth opportunity, dividend payments, firm size, and return 
on assets are positively related with the probability of adopting 
ESOPs. In contrast, aspects such as company leverage and 
ownership structure are negatively related with the adoption of 
ESOPs. 
Uchida (2006) 
782 Japanese companies 
between 1997 and 2000
Debt; dividend payments; 
firm size; growth 
opportunity; degree of 
independence.
Leverage and dividend payments have a negative relationship 
with the probability of adopting ESOPs, while firm size, growth 
opportunities, and the degree of independence have a positive 
relationship. 
Tzioumis 
(2008) 
909 U.S. companies in the 
period from 1994 to 2004
CEO rotativity; firm 
risk; CEO shareholder 
participation; CEO age; 
public sector companies.
Positive relationship between both CEO rotativity and firm risk 
and the probability of the company adopting ESOPs; in contrast, 
CEO shareholder participation, CEO age, and public sector 
companies presented a negative relationship with the probability 
of adopting ESOPs.
Chourou et al. 
(2008) 
196 companies in the 
period from 2001 to 2004
Growth opportunity; 
firm size; leverage; CEO 
age; CEO shareholder 
participation; and large 
blockholding shareholders.
Positive relationship with growth opportunities and firm size and 
negative relationship with leverage, CEO age, CEO shareholder 
participation, and large blockholding shareholders.
Avallone et al. 
(2014) 
155 companies in the 
period from 2000 to 2009
IFRS implementation; 
financial crisis; alignment 
of incentives; liquidity 
constraints; tax benefits; 
growth opportunity.
The obligation of IFRS 2 did not reduce ESOP adoption. In 
contrast, the financial crisis resulted in a reduction in the use 
of this model. Regarding growth opportunity and alignment of 
incentives, a positive correlation was verified with increased 
stock option plan use. Liquidity constraint and tax benefits were 
shown to be less significant with regard to the  use of ESOPs. 
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Authors/year Sample Metrics Results
Luo (2015) 
212 Chinese companies 
from January of 2006 to 
June of 2013
Company size; 
dividends; types of 
ownership; market-to-
book; previous share 
return.
The company size, dividends, and ownership type variables 
are negatively related with the use of stock options. Market-
to-book and previous share returns presented a positive 
correlation with remuneration based on stock options, but only 
for those going to senior managers.
Dias (2010) 237 companies in 2009
Capital concentration; 
industry regulation; firm 
size; growth opportunity; 
foreign shareholder 
participation.
The capital concentration and industry regulation variables 
presented a negative relationship with the use of stock 
options, while the firm size, growth opportunity, and foreign 
shareholder participation variables revealed a positive 
relationship.
Kaveski et al. 
(2015) 
27 companies
ROA; market-to-book; 
total revenue.
All the variables were shown to be statistically significant, 
but only market-to-book revealed a positive relationship with 
stock-based remuneration.
Moura et al. 
(2016)
158 publicly-traded 
Brazilian companies in 
the period from 2009 to 
2012
Current liquidity; horizon 
problem; shareholder 
participation.
The variables were shown to be statistically significant 
and with a positive relationship, and could be considered 
determinants for the adoption of stock options plans.
CEO = chief executive officer; ESOP = employee stock options plans; IFRS = International Financial Reporting Standards.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
There is a conflicting situation between the previous 
studies: Yermack (1995) and Ding and Sun (2001) find a 
positive relationship between company leverage and the 
probability of paying managers with shares, but Kato et 
al. (2005) and Uchida (2006) find a negative relationship; 
in relation to investment opportunities, Ding and Sun 
(2001), Kato et al. (2005), and Uchida (2006) perceive a 
positive and significant relationship, however for Tzioumis 
(2008) this relationship is inverted. For this reason, this 
study will also focus on the variables already studied 
in the literature by using a more robust econometric 
method and, in addition, taking advantage of the Brazilian 
institutional environment to provide evidence regarding 
an emergent market.
Moreover, we add new possible determinants not 
used in previous studies, such as chair duality, since CEO 
duality may be a sign of possible manager dominance 
over company decisions (Morck, 2007) and, thus, CEOs 
could decide their own remuneration. In addition, we also 
add the percentage of the company under the controller’s 
power after considering possible control pyramids, thus 
seeking to monitor the probability of the controller 
expropriating the minority shareholders (Wang & Xiao, 
2011).
3. METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURES
To gather and analyze the variables, remuneration 
and performance data were collected from reference 
forms, accounting statements, and management reports. 
These data were found on the B3 website and in the 
Comdinheiro database. The universe of the research 
was composed of all publicly-traded companies listed 
on the B3, corresponding to 330 firms. The table with 
the sectors and correlations between the variables is in 
the appendix (Table A1).
However, after collecting the reference form 
information – needed to obtain the information on 
stock-based compensation plans – and the data relating 
to the companies’ economic-financial performance, 
collected from the Comdinheiro database and the 
accounting statements, the sample was restricted to 
315 companies for the basic model and 287 with data 
available needed to estimate the complete model in the 
six years of the study.
It is worth mentioning that the analysis covered 2010 to 
2016, a period that includes the first year of the obligations 
– both for the companies to publish reference forms and 
adopt the international accounting rules – and runs up to 
the year all the data needed to fulfill the methodological 
aims of this study were available.
Table 1 
Cont.
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3.1 Econometric Model
With the aim of identifying how much the variables 
analyzed in this study interfere in stock-based payment, 
model 1 will be estimated considering two different 
dependent variables. First, it will be estimated considering 
the amount paid based on stocks over total company 
assets; second, it will be estimated how each variable 
interferes in the probability of a company using employee 
stock options plans, by estimating the following model:
in which REM will, in the first stage, be considered the 
total paid based on stocks / total assets and, in the second, 
it will be a binary variable with the value 1 if the company 
has made a payment based on stocks in period t, ROA 
(return on assets) is the ratio between operating profit and 
total assets, Tobin’s Q is the sum of market value and debt 
over total assets, Chairduality is a binary variable with the 
value 1 if the CEO also occupies the chairman of the board 
position, % Independents is the ratio between the number 
of independent members and the quantity of members on 
the board, Book Leverage is the division of total debt by 
total assets, Ln(Assets) is the proxy for company size, and 
finally, % Controller is the percentage of company shares 
in the controller’s power. Table 2 shows the specification 
of the variables used by this study, the previous studies 
that have worked with them, and their expected signs.
Table 2 
Summary of the independent variables used and their respective expected signs in the estimation of the stock-based 
remuneration model
Variable Form of measurement Previous studies Expected sign
REM
Total paid based on stocks/total 
assets
REM
1 for stock-based remuneration 
and 0 otherwise
Yermack (1995), Ding and 
Sun (2001), Kato et al. (2005), 
Uchida (2006), Chourou et al. 
(2008), Tzioumis (2008), Dias 
(2010), Avallone et al. (2014), 
Kaveski et al. (2015), Luo (2015), 
Moura et al. (2016).
ROA Operating profit/total assets
Kato et al. (2005), Kaveski et al. 
(2015).
+/-
Tobin’s Q
(Equity value + debt)/
total assets
Kato et al. (2005), Uchida 
(2006), Chourou et al. (2008), 
Tzioumis (2008), Dias (2010), 
Avallone et al. (2014).
+
Chairduality
1 if the CEO is also the chairman 
of the Board and 0 otherwise
+
% Independents
Number of independents/
size of the Board
Uchida (2006). -
Book Leverage Total liabilities/total assets
Yermack (1995), Kato et al. 
(2005), Uchida (2006), Chourou 
et al. (2008), Avallone et al. 
(2014).
-
Ln(Assets) Logarithm of total assets
Ding and Sun (2001), Kato et al. 
(2005), Uchida (2006), Chourou 
et al. (2008), Dias (2010), Luo 
(2015).
+
% Controller
Percentage of company shares in 
the controller’s power
-
CEO = chief executive officer.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
1
REM�,� =  β�,� + β�ROA�,� + β�Tobin�s Q�,� + 𝛽𝛽�Chairduality�,� −  β�% Independents�,� − β�Book Leverage�,� + β�Ln(Assets)�,�
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Regarding ROA, there is an undefined relationship, 
since the variable can behave positively, demonstrating 
that the company is in a good financial situation, which 
presupposes that the interests between shareholders and 
managers are aligned due to the use of the incentive. In 
contrast, this variable can also behave negatively; that is, 
the lower the ROA, the more companies will use stock 
options aiming to generate incentives for their executives 
to act in improving their performance.
A positive relationship is expected in the Tobin’s Q 
variable, given that the company is investing in new 
profitable projects, providing a greater opportunity for 
growth. Thus, the more future investment opportunities 
the company presents, the greater the quantity of resources 
that it will need to capture, stimulating the practicing 
of better mechanisms for aligning interests between 
shareholders and managers, vis-à-vis greater efforts 
from executives in the ventures. A positive relationship 
is also expected in the Chairduality variable, given that 
the chief executive tends to raise remuneration if he/she is 
head of the Board, considering his/her decision-making 
power and level of influence in the entity, thus tending 
to remunerate him/herself.
In the % Independents variable, it is undefined: the 
greater the degree of Board independence, the lower 
the probability will be of stock-based remuneration, 
depending a lot on the employment of greater control 
and monitoring in relation to the use of employee stock-
based plans or on a Board with greater independence 
using stock options to align incentives.
In the context of the Book Leverage variable, the 
probability of using a stock-based remuneration 
model is expected to be negatively related with its 
level of debt. In this case, leverage works as a liquidity 
constraint, meaning there is greater monitoring by 
banks, therefore negatively impacting the level of stock-
based remuneration used, and that a highly leveraged 
company opts to use options for remuneration due to 
lower cash levels.
For the Ln(Assets) variable, a positive relationship 
is expected, given that as company size increases, its 
difficulties in monitoring management actions also 
increase. Thus, the bigger the company, the greater the 
possibility of it having stock-based remuneration.
Finally, a positive relationship is expected between 
the variable relating to the percentage in the hands 
of the controller and the probability of using stock 
options. In other words, a company that presents a 
lower percentage of shares in the controller’s power 
tends to give greater decision-making power and more 
autonomy to the agents, meaning they are able to use 
this instrument more for self-remuneration. In addition, 
as different percentages of company shares can give 
different incentives for the expropriation of minority 
shareholders, we control for the percentage of firm 
ownership in the controller’s power.
4. RESULTS ANALYSIS
4.1 Descriptive Analysis
Table 3 provides the description of the data tabulated 
by company between 2010 and 2016, with the mean, 
standard deviation, and minimum and maximum value 
of the variables. Of the total companies analyzed, 40% of 
them used stock-based compensation plans. Based on the 
study from Dias (2010), there is a 7% increase in relation 
to 2009. Regarding the amount paid in stocks, this value 
remains low, representing only 0.03% of the company’s 
total assets in payments.
Concerning the ROA variable, measured by the ratio 
between operating profit and total assets, the companies 
presented a mean ROA of 4.19%. The standard deviation 
was higher than the mean, which shows the heterogeneity 
of the sample.
In 2011, the mean Tobin’s Q for the firms was 1.07, 
revealing that the companies’ market value is a little above 
their accounting value.
In relation to the Chairduality variable, 13% of the 
companies analyzed presented a CEO who was also the 
president of the organization.
In the case of the % Independents variable, which 
represents the proportion of independents on the Board 
of Directors and, therefore, who do not form part of the 
company’s workforce, the proportion of independents 
on the boards has a mean of 18%.
Analyzing the Book Leverage variable, measured by 
the ratio between total liabilities and total assets, a mean 
value of 22% is verified; that is, the average company in 
the sample uses third-party funding to finance 22% of its 
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assets. This result is in line with Kato et al. (2005), Uchida 
(2006), Chourou et al. (2008), and Avallone et al. (2014).
The penultimate variable refers to the logarithm of total 
assets, Ln(Assets), used as a proxy for company size. The 
companies presented a mean in log of 21, that is, average 
total assets of 1 billion reais.
The final variable consists of the percentage of shares in 
the hands of the controller. The data reveal that, on average, 
62% of total shares are in the hands of the controller, 
revealing a high concentration in the Brazilian market.
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Standard deviation Min. Max.
Remuneration in 
stocks/total assets (%)
2,508 0.0377 0.114 0 0.761
Based on stocks 2,733 0.405 0.491 0 1
Tobin’s Q 2,129 1.076 0.972 0.0403 5.672
ROA (%) 2,726 3.927 10.13 -46.69 46.62
Chairduality 2,733 0.136 0.343 0 1
% Independents 2,675 0.188 0.210 0 1
Book Leverage 2,733 0.224 0.184 0 0.647
Ln(Assets) 2,733 21.54 2.183 14.47 27.31
% Controller 2,271 62.17 23.18 16.04 100
Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Reference Form and Comdinheiro.
4.2 Econometric Analysis
To evaluate the factors that affect the magnitude of 
payment in stocks in the companies listed on the B3, 
model 1 was estimated with the dependent variable, the 
total paid in stock-based remuneration over total assets. 
The main results found are presented in Table 4.
The results reveal that only Tobin’s Q and Book Leverage 
were statistically significant and have a positive and 
negative relationship with the amount of stock-based 
remuneration, respectively. However, the governance, 
performance, and size variables did not present statistical 
significance, so they cannot be considered as factors 
estimated in the amount paid as stock-based remuneration.
In the case of the Tobin’s Q variable, given a positive 
variation in growth opportunities within the same 
company [remembering the presence of fixed effects 
in the firm; all the coefficients can be interpreted as 
a variation within the same individual, that is, in the 
company (Angrist & Pischke, 2008)], better instruments 
are needed for aligning interests between shareholders 
and managers. This is something that also involves the 
requirement to monitor the agent’s actions, given the 
difficulties, in firms with growth potential, to verify 
whether the executives are acting to promote the most 
profitable projects. Another explanation could be the 
possibility of using a greater incentive for executives 
to take advantage of these opportunities. This variable 
was shown to be statistically significant at the 1% level 
and had a positive sign even in the presence of the other 
variables, revealing that a one percentage point increase 
in investment opportunities is associated with a 0.02% 
increase in the amount paid based on stocks, that is, 
presenting a positive relationship with the level of stock 
options used. The results found are consistent with the 
studies from Kato et al. (2005), Uchida (2006), Chourou 
et al. (2008), Tzioumis (2008), Dias (2010), and Avallone 
et al. (2014).
With relation to Book Leverage, this variable was also 
significant at 1%, but had a negative sign, indicating that 
a one percentage point increase in leverage is associated 
with a 0.11% fall in the proportion of stock-based 
remuneration. These results are coherent with the studies 
from Kato et al. (2005) and Uchida (2006).
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Table 4 
Determinants of the amount of stock-based remuneration in the companies listed on the Bolsa, Brasil, Balcão (B3) in the 2010-
2016 period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Remuneration in stocks/total assets
Tobin’s Q
0.036*** 0.035*** 0.031** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.022***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
ROA 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Chairduality
0.002 0.000 0.003 0.004 0.007
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
% Independent
-0.020 -0.010 0.013 0.009 0.008
(0.026) (0.027) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Book Leverage
-0.086** -0.125*** -0.123*** -0.112***
(0.038) (0.040) (0.041) (0.038)
Ln(Assets)
-0.010 -0.012 -0.014 -0.016
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
% Controller
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant
0.002 0.007 0.256 0.294 0.348 0.405*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.184) (0.198) (0.220) (0.222)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No No No No No
Industry*Year No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 2,028 2,021 2,021 1,707 1,707 1,707
R-squared 0.045 0.046 0.059 0.064 0.074 0.133
Number of 
companies
315 315 315 287 287 287
Notes: Robust standard deviations in parentheses. 
FE = fixed effects.
***, **, * = statistically significant at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Reference Form and Comdinheiro. 
One argument used is that remuneration is the 
result of performance in the previous year and, thus, the 
estimations may be biased due to simultaneity; therefore, 
model 1 was estimated with all the variables lagged by 
one period.
Table 5 reveals that some of the results remained 
unaltered and Tobin’s Q loses significance after the addition 
of variables referring to financial characteristics, such as 
leverage and size. However, even with the Industry*Year 
fixed effects, the leverage variable remained significant, 
indicating that the amount paid in stocks is negatively 
related to the company’s leverage. The explanation is 
that an increase in a firm’s indebtedness would increase 
exposure to systemic risk and, thus, to preserve liquidity, 
it opts to pay its managers with stocks to avoid spending 
cash (Kato et al. 2005).
Table 5 
Determinants of the amount of stock-based remuneration in the companies listed on the Bolsa, Brasil, Balcão (B3) in the 2010-
2016 period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Remuneration in stocks/total assets
Tobin’s Q
0.018** 0.018** 0.014 0.005 0.009 0.011
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
ROA 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Chairduality
0.005 0.004 -0.002 -0.002 0.001
(0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
% Independent
0.004 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.005
(0.028) (0.028) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
Book Leverage
-0.028 -0.085** -0.088** -0.092***
(0.036) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Stock-based compensation plan: an analysis of the determinants of its use
94 R. Cont. Fin. – USP, São Paulo, v. 31, n. 82, p. 84-98, jan./abr. 2020
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Remuneration in stocks/total assets
Ln(Assets)
-0.010 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
% Controller
0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant
0.020** 0.019* 0.251 0.232 0.235 0.229
(0.009) (0.010) (0.156) (0.163) (0.170) (0.170)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No No No Yes No
Industry*Year No No No No No Yes
Observations 1,726 1,720 1,720 1,458 1,458 1,458
R-squared 0.013 0.014 0.020 0.028 0.038 0.133
Number of 
companies
306 305 305 273 273 273
Notes: Robust standard deviations in parentheses. 
FE = fixed effects.
***, **, * = statistically significant at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Reference Form and Comdinheiro. 
Table 6 reveals the estimation of the second part of 
the analysis, in which the dependent variable is whether 
the company adopts an stock-based compensation plan 
or not. From Table 4, it is possible to note that the use of 
options is positively related to investment opportunities 
and size. A one percentage point increase is associated 
with a 100% increase in the probability of an option 
plans being used, since a 1% increase in total assets 
is associated with a 47% increase in the probability of 
using a stock-based plan, thus corroborating the studies 
from Kato et al. (2005), Uchida (2006), and Chourou 
et al. (2008).
Table 6 
Determinants of the choice of stock-based remuneration in the companies listed on the Bolsa, Brasil, Balcão (B3) in the 2010-
2016 period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Remuneration in stocks/total assets
Tobin’s Q
0.571*** 0.626*** 0.797*** 0.768*** 1.009*** 1.069***
(0.204) (0.201) (0.204) (0.247) (0.266) (0.303)
ROA 
-0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.017 -0.015 -0.017
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.022) (0.024) (0.028)
Chairduality
-0.517 -0.287 -0.308 -0.036 -0.107
(0.426) (0.423) (0.458) (0.487) (0.553)
% Independent
2.138*** 1.697** 1.560* 1.393 1.137
(0.768) (0.760) (0.946) (1.023) (1.192)
Book Leverage
0.513 -0.452 -1.494 -0.618
(1.049) (1.247) (1.388) (1.626)
Ln(Assets)
0.482*** 0.471*** 0.434** 0.478**
(0.137) (0.155) (0.170) (0.194)
% Controlador
-0.013 -0.015 -0.022*
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012)
Firm FE No No No No No No
Year FE No No No No Yes No
Industry*Year No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 1,809 1,797 1,797 1,529 1,529 1,529
Notes: Robust standard deviations in parentheses. All the coefficients are set out as marginal effects.
FE = fixed effects.
***, **, * = statistically significant at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Reference Form and Comdinheiro. 
Table 5 
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As another form of robustness, the model referring 
to the amount paid based on stocks was estimated using 
the systemic Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
methodology. In general, the results corroborate the 
previous methods, such as the positive relationship 
between Tobin’s Q and the amount paid; however, the 
numerical instability of the estimator should be take 
into consideration, as well as the criticism from Roberts 
and Whited (2013), in which the basic premise of the 
GMM of non-correlation between the lagged variables, 
for them to be used as an instrument, is not plausible for 
the corporate finance setting.
Thus, the most appropriate results are those obtained 
using ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations and fixed 
effects in the firm and Industry*Year.
Table 7 
Robustness test using the systemic Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation, for the 2010-2016 period
(1) (2)
sharesTA_w sharesTA_w
Tobin’s Q
0.0153** 0.0186***
(0.00616) (0.00609)
ROA 
-0.00118* -0.00136
(0.000714) (0.000910)
Chairduality
-0.00892 -0.0122
(0.00807) (0.0110)
% Independent
0.0582** 0.0704***
(0.0240) (0.0219)
Book Leverage
0.0137 -0.00942
(0.0264) (0.0278)
Ln(Assets)
-0.00298 -0.00296
(0.00473) (0.00440)
% Controller
-0.000142 -0.000159
(0.000269) (0.000359)
Constant
0.0553 0.0967
(0.114) (0.106)
Firm FE Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes
Industry*Year Yes No
Hansen Overid Test 0.885 0.27
Observations 1,458 1,458
Number of companies 273 273
Notes: Robust standard deviations in parentheses. 
FE = fixed effects.
***, **, * = statistically significant at 1, 5, and 10%, respectively. 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Reference Form and Comdinheiro. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The inherent conflicts of interests present in joint-stock 
companies have motivated the search for mechanisms that 
incentivize agents to act in accordance with shareholder 
interests. One of these instruments, which has acquired 
an important connotation in the organizational setting, 
consists of the stock-based compensation plan. Based 
on the assumption that companies in Brazil have been 
adopting this instrument more and more, shown by 
the descriptive analysis, this study had two aims: (i) to 
investigate the main aspects that determined the use of the 
stock-based remuneration model; and (ii) to investigate 
the factors that influence the stock-based amount paid. 
Both objectives were achieved by analyzing data from 
companies listed on the B3 in the period from 2010 to 
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2016, using a sample of 287 companies that trade their 
shares on the B3. 
This study stands out from the others by introducing 
new variables into the analysis of the determinants of 
the adoption of stock-based compensation plans, which 
correspond to the existence of a CEO who is also the 
head of the Board of Directors and the percentage of 
shares in the hands of the controller. Besides investigating 
the factors that influence the amount paid in stocks, it 
provided empirical evidence for an emergent market with 
concentrated ownership.
The descriptive analysis identified that 43% of the 
companies used stock-based compensation plans; however, 
the value paid remains low, at 0.03% of total assets.
Thus, to achieve the first objective, a logit regression 
with panel data was used, seeking to find the determining 
aspects for stock-based compensation plans, taking 
seven variables as a reference: (i) Tobin’s Q; (ii) ROA; (iii) 
Chairduality; (iv) % Independents; (v) Book Leverage; 
(vi) Ln(Assets); and (vii) % Controller. After estimating 
the model, the results showed that the determinants for 
adopting stock-based compensation plans are positively 
related to the firms’ growth opportunities, when measured 
by Tobin’s Q and company size. The positive relationship 
with investment opportunities corroborates the studies 
from Kato et al. (2005), Uchida (2006), Chourou et al. 
(2008), Tzioumis (2008), Dias (2010), and Avallone et al. 
(2014). With regards to size, the result is in line with those 
found by Ding and Sun (2001), Kato et al. (2005), Uchida 
(2006), Chourou et al. (2008), Dias (2010), and Luo (2015).
Nonetheless, it is important to mention that this 
research did not find any relationship between the 
adoption of stock-based payment programs and variables 
related to corporate governance and performance.
Moreover, with regards to the second objective, using 
a linear regression with panel data and fixed effects in the 
firm and in the Industry*Year so as to exclude constant 
unobservable heterogeneities in time for the firms, as well 
as demand shocks or factors particular to the industry 
in some year, it was identified that leverage is associated 
with the amount paid based on stocks. One possible 
explanation is that the firms use this instrument at times 
when their cash flows are compromised and choose to 
remunerate their executive in stocks instead to cash; 
another variable associated with the amount is Tobin’s 
Q, a proxy for investment opportunities, showing that 
an increase in the company’s investment opportunities 
causes a greater amount received by the managers in 
order to align efforts and interests.
Possible explanations for these results lie in the 
assumptions that firms with growth potential need 
mechanisms that enable the alignment of interests between 
parties, that larger companies are more likely to use this 
instrument, given the difficulties of monitoring managers’ 
actions, and that entities without a controller give more 
autonomy to the agents who, in turn, seek to maximize their 
own pay, which leads to greater use of stock options plans.
Comparing with other empirical studies, despite the 
previous conflicting evidence, it is important to highlight 
that this research supported a liquidity-preserving feature 
and the alignment of interests between manager and 
shareholder, as well as company size being a determining 
characteristic. Nonetheless, this research adopted fixed 
effects in order to control for unobservable heterogeneities, 
both at the firm level and for macroeconomic shocks in 
particular sectors.
Regarding the limitations of the study, it is important 
to mention that it is not causal in nature, since in order 
to find causality between the variables, random stock-
based remuneration among and within the companies 
would be needed; in addition, the study is based on 
information about remuneration provided to the CVM 
by the companies, which are not audited. Moreover, some 
companies in this period made use of legal instruments 
in order not to disclose remuneration.
As a suggestion for future studies, we recommend 
analyzing the three types of stock-based compensation 
plans (at the money, out of the money, and in the money) 
with the aim of measuring which one promotes the greatest 
incentive for the employee. In addition, it is important to 
use different variables in order to find other determinants 
that explain the adoption of stock-based compensation 
plans. Finally, it is important to analyze the differences 
between companies that use stock options plans for their 
executives with those that do not, verifying whether these 
differences affect company performance.
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APPENDIX
Table A1
Number of companies by sector
Sector n %
Industrial goods 328 12
Construction and transport 44 2
Cyclical consumption 480 18
Non-cyclical consumption 207 8
Financial and others 602 22
Hotels and restaurants 4 0
Raw materials 262 10
Oil, gas, and biofuels 46 2
Chemicals 2 0
Health 98 4
Information technology 57 2
Telecommunications 85 3
Public utility 518 19
Total 2,733 100
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
Table A2 
Correlation between the study variables
Stock-based 
remuneration
Tobin’s Q ROA (%) Chairduality
% 
Independents
Book 
Leverage
Ln(Assets) % Controller
Tobin’s Q 0.400
ROA (%) 0.139 0.576
Chairduality -0.0519 -0.0382 0.0427
% Independents 0.223 0.153 0.0174 -0.170
Book Leverage -0.0552 -0.00480 -0.131 -0.144 0.191
Ln(Assets) -0.0699 -0.184 0.00470 -0.136 0.202 0.299
% Controller -0.106 0.0444 -0.0236 0.0389 -0.260 -0.110 -0.239
Stock-based 
remuneration
0.449 0.232 0.0232 -0.0620 0.264 0.0339 0.0810 -0.172
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
